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FOREWORD
With the recent lightning swift combat successes of Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM, there may be a tendency to view with awe the
lethality of U.S. technology and training. Indeed, the U.S. military
is unmatched in the raw combat power it is capable of unleashing in
a conflict. This monograph, however, argues that the true strength
of America’s military might lies not in its hardware or high-tech
equipment, but in its soldiers.
Dr. Leonard Wong and his colleagues traveled to Iraq to see
what motivated soldiers to continue in battle, to face extreme
danger, and to risk their lives in accomplishing the mission. As
a means of comparison, they began by interviewing Iraqi Regular
Army prisoners of war to examine their combat motivation and unit
dynamics. The researchers then interviewed U.S. combat troops
fresh from the fields of battle to examine their views.
What they found was that today’s U.S. soldiers, much like
soldiers of the past, fight for each other. Unit cohesion is alive and
well in today’s Army. Yet, Dr. Wong and his fellow researchers
also found that soldiers cited ideological reasons such as liberation,
freedom, and democracy as important factors in combat motivation.
Today’s soldiers trust each other, they trust their leaders, they trust
the Army, and they also understand the moral dimensions of war.
This year marks the 30th anniversary of the all-volunteer Army.
This monograph is a celebration of the success of that radical idea
and the transformation of the U.S. Army from a demoralized draft
army, to a struggling all-volunteer force, to a truly professional Army.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of the
American soldier to the national defense community as policymakers
continue to chart the course of the Army’s transformation.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Since World War II, studies have argued and conventional
wisdom has claimed that soldiers fight for each other. Cohesion,
or the bonds between soldiers, traditionally has been posited as the
primary motivation for soldiers in combat. Recent studies, however,
have questioned the effects of cohesion on unit performance. This
monograph reviews the combat motivation literature and then
analyzes findings from interviews conducted during the recent Iraq
War.
By examining the perspectives of Iraqi Regular Army prisoners
of war, U.S. troops, and embedded media, the monograph argues
that unit cohesion is indeed a primary combat motivation. The
report also notes that, contrary to previous studies of U.S. soldiers,
notions of freedom, democracy, and liberty were also voiced by
soldiers as key factors in combat motivation.
The monograph concludes that soldiers continue to fight for each
other, but today’s soldiers are also sophisticated enough to grasp
the moral concepts of war. The report suggests that this is a result
of the transformation of the Army from a fledgling all-volunteer
experiment to a truly professional force.
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WHY THEY FIGHT:
COMBAT MOTIVATION IN THE IRAQ WAR
Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare to
attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure
of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack
resolutely.1
Ardant du Picq, 1870

Introduction.
This monograph seeks to answer the question: Why do soldiers
fight? It begins with a historical overview of the combat motivation
literature and examines studies from World War II, Korea, and
Vietnam. It then shifts to the recent Iraq War and analyzes the
results of interviews with Iraqi Regular Army prisoners of war,
U.S. combat troops, and embedded media. The varied perspectives
combine to show the critical importance of unit cohesion in combat
motivation but also highlight how today’s soldiers are different from
U.S. soldiers of the past.
Why Do Soldiers Fight?
The motivations of America’s conscripted soldiers was a growing
concern during the early stages of World War II, as the Army ranks
swelled with freshly drafted soldiers. As Kansas newspaper editor
William Allen White noted, soldiers of a draft army “haven’t the
slightest enthusiasm for this war or this cause. They aren’t grouchy,
they are not mutinous, they just don’t give a tinker’s dam.”2 After
noting the ineffectiveness of prepared lectures read to bored troops,
Chief of Staff of the Army General George C. Marshall brought in
movie producer Frank Capra and told him to make a movie that
would “explain to our boys in the Army why we are fighting, and
the principles for which we are fighting.”3 Critics claimed that there
were more important things to do, but Marshall insisted on men
motivated and knowledgeable about the democratic cause. The
seven-part Why We Fight film series resulted and was widely used
during World War II.4 The riveting film series emphasized that the
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war was not “just a war against Axis villainy, but for liberty, equality,
and security.”5
After World War II, a series of studies emerged that examined
the motivation of soldiers during combat--to determine why a
“tired, cold, muddy rifleman goes forward with the bitter dryness
of fear in his mouth into the mortar bursts and machine-gun fire of a
determined enemy.”6 Was it for ideological reasons as suggested by
the Why We Fight series?
In his widely acclaimed work, The American Soldier, Samuel
Stouffer documented the attitudes of World War II combat
infantrymen. When soldiers were asked what kept them going
during the war, the most common response was getting the war over
so that they could go home. The second most common response
and the primary combat motivation, however, referred to the strong
group ties that developed during combat.7 When asked about
sources of support during combat, responses concerning loyalty to
one’s buddies and the notion “that you couldn’t let the other men
down” were second only to the number of combat soldiers who
said they were helped by prayer.8 Despite the Why We Fight films,
Stouffer’s study argued that ideology, patriotism, or fighting for the
cause were not major factors in combat motivation for World War
II soldiers. Cohesion, or the emotional bonds between soldiers,
appeared to be the primary factor in combat motivation.
Historian S. L. A. Marshall reinforced the importance of the bonds
between soldiers in his examination of World War II infantrymen in
Men Against Fire. He noted, “I hold it to be one of the simplest truths
of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going
with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of
a comrade. . . . He is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his
weapons secondarily.”9 As for fighting for a cause, Marshall wrote,
“Men do not fight for a cause but because they do not want to let
their comrades down.”10
In another landmark study on combat motivation, Shils and
Janowitz interviewed Wehrmacht prisoners in an attempt to
determine why some continued to fight so determinedly despite
the overwhelmingly obvious evidence that Germany would lose the
war. Testing the belief that good soldiers were those who clearly
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understood the political and moral implications of what was at
stake, they concluded that the behavior and attitudes of infantrymen
who fought to the end derived, instead, from the interpersonal
relationships within the primary group (although they did note an
allegiance to Hitler as a secondary motivation.) From their research,
they concluded that:
When the individual’s immediate group, and its supporting formations,
met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from
both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and
adequately regulated his relations with authority, the element of
self-concern in battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective
functioning of his primary group, was minimized.11

The emphasis on unit cohesion as the primary source of combat
motivation continued into the Korean War. Sociologist Roger Little
observed a rifle company in combat for several months and found
that the bonded relationships between men in combat--what he
called “buddy relations”--were critical to basic survival.12 To Little,
buddy relations could refer to a specific soldier or the entire unit.
During the Vietnam War, noted military sociologist Charles
Moskos interviewed soldiers and concluded that combat primary
group ties serve an important role in unit effectiveness. Interestingly,
Moskos argued that the close bonds with other soldiers may be
a result of self-interested concern for personal safety rather than
an altruistic concern for fellow soldiers.13 Regardless, Moskos
reinforced the critical role of cohesion in combat performance.
Despite the wide acceptance of the importance of interpersonal
relationships between soldiers in combat,14 things began to change
in the later stages of the Vietnam War. In their controversial book,
Crisis in Command, Gabriel and Savage claimed that the individual
replacement system in Vietnam and the lack of professionalism in
the officer corps led to the dissolution of primary group cohesion
in the Army. While their conclusions about the causes of the
decline of cohesion can be questioned, they did bring attention to
a potentially deleterious effect of cohesion--fragging. They pointed
out that cohesion between soldiers without the proper norms can
work against organizational goals as in the case of nearly 800 cases
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of fragging in Vietnam.15
More recently, cohesion in the military has been addressed by
several critical studies that go beyond highlighting the potentially
detrimental effects of cohesion and instead challenge the correlation
of unit cohesion with performance. Interestingly, the subject of
many of these studies is not cohesion, but the current Department
of Defense (DoD) policy on homosexual conduct. The current policy
assumes that, “The presence in the armed forces of persons who
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts
would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale,
good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of
military capability [emphasis added].”16 Arguing that unit cohesion
is not critical to military capability supports efforts to change the
DoD policy. To this end, researchers such as Elizabeth Kier examined
the cohesion literature and concluded that “fifty years of research in
several disciplines has failed to uncover persuasive evidence . . . that
there is a causal relationship leading from primary group cohesion
to military effectiveness.”17
In a 1993 RAND report, Robert MacCoun argued that actually
two types of cohesion exist. According to MacCoun, social cohesion
refers to the quality of the bonds of friendship and emotional
closeness among unit members--the type of cohesion referred to by
the post-World War II studies. Task cohesion, on the other hand,
refers to the commitment among unit members to accomplish a task
that requires the collective efforts of the unit. MacCoun argued that
task cohesion is correlated with unit performance, not social cohesion.
Social cohesion, according to MacCoun, has little relationship to
performance, and can even interfere with unit performance (e.g.,
rate busting, groupthink, or fragging).18 MacCoun’s arguments
are echoed by Segal and Kestnbaum who stated that, “There is no
clear causal link that can be demonstrated using rigorous methods
between social cohesion and high levels of military performance.”19
Despite an emerging debate about cohesion occurring in the
academic realm, it is tempting to believe that it has little relevance in
the Army policy arena. Three factors suggest otherwise. First, the
homosexual conduct policy assumes that unit cohesion is essential
to military capability. Determining the role of cohesion in combat
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motivation helps inform that policy debate.
Second, the Army is pushing ahead with the Unit Manning
Initiative that rests on the premise that “full-spectrum forces must
be highly cohesive teams whose shared experiences and intensive
training enable them to perform better in combat.”20 As the 172nd
Infantry Brigade transforms to a Stryker Brigade Combat Team and
implements a unit manning personnel system, its soldiers will arrive
and train together through a standard 36-month tour. If cohesion is
truly unimportant to unit performance as recent critics suggest, then
the Army is putting an abundance of resources into a radical change
that may produce a modicum of results.
Finally, discussions at the DoD level have been exploring the
difference between task and social cohesion and which has the
biggest impact on the military. One view maintains that the Services
already do a good job of getting people who “don’t like one another”
to work well together, so social cohesion may be unnecessary. Given
that the academic debate concerning cohesion has moved into the
policy arena, an exploration of cohesion--specifically social cohesion
--and the broader topic of combat motivation, is warranted.
Methodology.
This monograph analyzes motivation and cohesion in combat.
The backdrop for analysis was Operation IRAQI FREEDOM with
major combat operations occurring roughly from March 20, 2003,
to May 1, 2003. To examine the concepts of combat motivation
and cohesion, views were solicited from three distinct samples that
experienced combat during IRAQI FREEDOM.
The first sample consisted of Iraqi Regular Army soldiers. The
combat motivation of Iraqi soldiers was analyzed through interviews
with enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) held at Camp Bucca at Umm
Qasr, Iraq.21 Nearly all of the EPWs questioned were lower enlisted
Iraqi soldiers; two officers, a lieutenant colonel and a lieutenant,
were also interviewed. Only two soldiers, both sergeants, claimed
membership in a Republican Guard or Special Republican Guard
unit. In this sample, then, views probably represent rank-and-file
soldiers, rather than elite units or senior leaders. The researchers
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conducted, recorded, translated, and transcribed over 30 interviews,
using a structured interview format. 22
To gain the U.S. perspective, researchers met with troops assigned
to the maneuver units of the three U.S. divisions conducting the
majority of combat operations--the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 1st Marine Division.23
Researchers conducted interviews at unit locations in the vicinity of
Baghdad and Al Hillah prior to the official cessation of major combat
operations. They conducted, recorded, and transcribed over 40
interviews.24 The same structured interview format was used with
both Iraqi EPWs and U.S. troops--thus providing a good comparison
and contrast of issues across both armies.
Embedded media represent the third sample used to analyze
cohesion and motivation in combat. They furnished a unique
perspective on cohesion and combat motivation for two reasons.
First, they were able to comment on small unit dynamics without
being a part of the small unit. Second, prior to the war, much
discussion concerned the embedded media needing to avoid
developing emotional relationships with unit soldiers in order to
remain objective journalists. The personal reflections of the media’s
experience help to explore the role of cohesion in combat. Over a
dozen members of the media embedded in U.S. Army ground units
were interviewed in person or telephonically, or responded to an
email questionnaire.
Motivated by Fear.
During World War II, Stouffer asked combat veterans the
question, “Generally, in your combat experience, what was most
important to you in making you want to keep going and do as well
as you could?” The same question concerning combat motivation
was asked of the Iraqi EPWs. Iraqi EPWs were expected to respond
that they were motivated to fight for each other (as earlier research
had shown with the Wehrmacht or North Vietnam’s Viet Cong) or
were simply defending their homeland.25
Instead, the near universal response was that the Iraqi Regular
Army soldiers were motivated by coercion. Even with the powerful
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coalition forces to their front, they were fearful of the dreaded Baath
Party to their rear. Their behavior was driven by fear of retribution
and punishment by Baath Party or Fedayeen Saddam if they were
found avoiding combat. Iraqi soldiers related stories of being jailed
or beaten by Baath Party representatives if they were suspected of
leaving their units. Several showed scars from previous desertion
attempts. One soldier related how he still felt guilty that his mother
was jailed in response to his AWOL26 status several years before.
When Iraqi soldiers described the desertion of their comrades,
they noted the universal practice of deserting with small arms,
rather than burying their weapons in the sand as U.S. psychological
leaflets had urged. Deserters remained armed to protect themselves
against the Fedayeen Saddam death squads they expected to find in
Iraqi rear areas. The decision to desert with arms is one not taken
lightly because it increased the likelihood of being killed by U.S.
or British forces, particularly reconnaissance units common to the
most forward elements. Armed desertion, then, represented clear
evidence of the fear experienced by those who wished neither to
fight nor surrender.
Surprisingly, fear of retribution was usually not attached to
officers serving in Iraqi units. Most of the enlisted soldiers described
their officers as distant, but normally not as a threat. Iraqi officer
training was described by a captured graduate of the Baghdad
Military Academy as “on the Sandhurst model,” suggesting a British
influence and a subsequent separation between the ranks of officers
and enlisted. Officers were often politically appointed and not
regarded as tactically competent by their men. Such circumstances
led to little mutual respect between officers and the enlisted soldiers,
but the strained relationship was far from intimidating. Several
prisoners reported that if their officers had tried to force them to fight,
they would have simply killed them and surrendered anyway. No
prisoner ever described an attempt by officers to compel resistance
against coalition forces.
Surrender decisions, in the sample interviewed, were usually
made at very low levels, often among small groups of soldiers, and
were not attributed to the capitulation of a higher headquarters.
Artillery shelling or air attack sometimes catalyzed surrender--
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though none of the soldiers interviewed had to withstand lengthy
bombardment. Officers permitted surrender, sometimes by their
own desertion, sometimes by benign neglect. One officer stated,
when questioned about why he had not forced his men to fight, “As
a man before Allah, that would have been the wrong thing to do.”
Although he understood that his mission was to defend along the
edge of an oil field, he had no map, no plan, and no communication
with his higher headquarters. The ability of the Iraqi small unit
leadership to invoke loyalty and influence up and down the
command chain was almost completely lacking and unquestionably
contributed to the disintegration of Iraqi Regular Army units in the
face of advancing coalition forces.
As far as cohesion serving as a factor in combat motivation,
questioning revealed that if Iraqi Regular Army soldiers had
emotional ties to other soldiers, they were almost always with
soldiers from their tribe or region. Squads and platoons had little
or no cohesion. Iraq’s approximately 150 major tribes are comprised
of more than 2,000 smaller clans with a wide range of religions
and ethnic groups. Soldiers spoke of units fragmented by tribal
or regional differences. In addition, units were at such reduced
strength that manning issues may have exacerbated the effects of
fragmentation. No Iraqi soldier reported a unit strength greater
than 40 percent. One of the two officers in the sample, a platoon
leader, found his unit composed of only nine men of more than 48
authorized.
Many soldiers reported the practice of constantly asking (and
bribing) their officers for permission to go home to their families for
ten days out of every month. As Shils and Janowitz in the World
War II study of German prisoners found, surrender decisions
are greatly facilitated when primary groups are disrupted. The
surrendering Iraqi soldiers showed little or no concern about letting
their comrades down since their allegiances to their fellow soldiers in
the unit were already strained or never fully cultivated. One BMP27
driver related how, despite the fact that one of his friends was both
his vehicle commander and his immediate supervisor, his surrender
decision was easily made at home where he was physically and
emotionally separated from his unit.
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Interviews uncovered no evidence of higher order concepts
such as commitment to national service or the Arabic obligation
to withstand (Sumoud) among the Iraqi soldiers interviewed. The
soldiers never invoked Iraqi nationalism or the need to repel
Americans as an invading army in response to questions about
why they were in the Army, or what would cause them to try their
hardest in battle.28
The Iraqi Regular Army appeared to be a poorly trained, poorly
led, disparate group of conscripts who were more concerned with
self-preservation and family ties than defending their country. It
provided a good case study of what happens to a unit when social
cohesion and leadership are absent.
Motivated for Others.
When U.S. troops were interviewed shortly after their experience
in combat (for most, it was 3 weeks of continuous enemy contact),
one of the first questions the researchers posed addressed their
reasons for entering the military in the first place. The responses
were what most recruiters already know--to get money for college,
to gain experience before looking for a job, to follow in the footsteps
of a family member who had been in the military, or just to find
some adventure before settling down. Although one or two
mentioned that they were motivated to enlist because of September
11, 2001, most did not cite patriotism or ideology as their enlistment
rationale.
As the interview progressed, soldiers were asked the same
question posed to World War II combat soldiers by Stouffer and
also to the Iraqi EPWs in this monograph--“Generally, in your
combat experience, what was most important to you in making you
want to keep going and do as well as you could?” For World War
II soldiers, besides ending the task to go home, the most common
response was solidarity with one’s comrades. For Iraqi Regular
Army soldiers, it was coercion. For U.S. soldiers in the Iraq War,
similar responses were given about going home, but importantly the
most frequent response given for combat motivation was “fighting
for my buddies.” Soldiers answered with comments such as, “In
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combat, just the fact that if I give up, I am not helping my buddies.
That is number one.” or “Me and my loader were talking about it,
and in combat the only thing that we really worry about is you and
your crew.” The soldiers were talking about social cohesion--the
emotional bonds between soldiers.
Social cohesion appears to serve two roles in combat motivation.
First, because of the close ties to other soldiers, it places a burden of
responsibility on each soldier to achieve group success and protect
the unit from harm. Soldiers feel that although their individual
contribution to the group may be small, it is still a critical part of
unit success and therefore important. As one soldier put it, “I am
the lowest ranking private on the Bradley [fighting vehicle] so I am
trying to kind of prove something in a way that I could do things. I
did not want to let anyone down.”
This desire to contribute to the unit mission comes not from a
commitment to the mission, but a social compact with the members
of the primary group. One Bradley Commander (BC) spoke of the
infantrymen in the back of his vehicle and the responsibility he felt
for them:
You have two guys in the back who are not seeing what is going on, and
they are putting all their trust into the gunner and the BC. Whatever
objects or obstacles, or tanks or vehicles are in front of you, you are
taking them out, because they don’t know what is going on. They are
just like in a dark room. They can’t do nothing. Having that trust. . . . I
guess that is one thing that kept me going.

One soldier simply stated, “I know that as far as myself, sir, I
take my squad mates’ lives more important than my own.” Another
soldier related the intense burden he felt for his fellow soldiers,
“That person means more to you than anybody. You will die if he
dies. That is why I think that we protect each other in any situation.
I know that if he dies and it was my fault, it would be worse than
death to me.”
The second role of cohesion is to provide the confidence and
assurance that someone soldiers could trust was “watching their
back.” This is not simply trusting in the competence, training,
or commitment to the mission of another soldier, but trusting in
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someone they regarded as closer than a friend who was motivated
to look out for their welfare. In the words of one infantryman, “You
have got to trust them more than your mother, your father, or
girlfriend, or your wife, or anybody. It becomes almost like your
guardian angel.”
The presence of comrades imparts a reassuring belief that all will
be well. As one soldier stated, “It is just like a big family. Nothing
can come to you without going through them first. It is kind of
comforting.” One soldier noted, “If he holds my back, then I will
hold his, and nothing is going to go wrong.” Another added, “If
you are going to war, you want to be able to trust the person who
is beside you. If you are his friend, you know he is not going to let
you down. . . . He is going to do his best to make sure that you don’t
die.”
Once soldiers are convinced that their own personal safety will
be assured by others, they feel empowered to do their job without
worry. One soldier attempted to describe how the close relationship
he had with another soldier provided the psychological cushion to
drive his vehicle without concern:
I knew Taylor would personally look out for me. . . . It was stupid little
things like, ‘Dude, you look like you need a hug.’ He would come over
and give me a big old bear hug. He knew that I looked out for him
and vice versa. . . . Knowing that there is somebody watching when I
didn’t have the opportunity to watch myself when I am driving--Taylor
watched everywhere. When I am driving down the road, I have to
watch in front of me knowing where I am driving and knowing that I
am not going to drive over anything. I don’t know what is behind me.
I don’t know what is to my side. I trusted Taylor was going to keep an
eye on everything. He always did. Obviously, he did. We are still here.
Thank God.

It should be noted that soldiers understood that totally entrusting
their personal safety to others could be viewed as irrational. One
young soldier commented on his parents’ reaction--“My whole
family thinks that I am a nut. They think, ‘How can you put your
life in someone’s hands like that? . . . You are still going to be shot.’”
Despite the occasional skepticism of outsiders, soldiers greatly
valued being free of the distracting concerns of personal safety.
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Of course, anyone who has been around soldiers for any period of
time recognizes that there is always a level of bickering and quarreling
occurring between soldiers--especially in austere conditions. Social
cohesion in combat, however, manages to overcome petty disputes.
A soldier put it this way:
I think that when we are here and we are living and seeing each other
every single day going on 6 months, there is a lot of [stuff] that you just
get irritated with and don’t want to be around one another. But in the
same sense, I think that everybody learned that no matter how [ticked]
off we were at one another and how bad we were fighting, when the
artillery started raining down and [stuff] started hitting the fan--it was
like the [stuff] never happened. Everybody just did what we had to
do. It was just looking out for one another. We weren’t fighting for
anybody else but ourselves. We weren’t fighting for some higher-up
who is somebody; we were just fighting for each other.

The bonds of trust between soldiers take weeks and months to
develop. Soldiers related how shared experiences prior to combat
helped develop those bonds. One soldier related how the weeks
of training prior to deployment helped build relationships between
soldiers:
Going out and constantly training together, NTC rotations. . . . We are
together every day for the majority of the day, 5 days a week. You are
going to start knowing what ticks people off, what makes them happy,
what you need to do to work with them. Eventually a bond is going to
form.

Once deployed, soldiers spent more time together training. As
one soldier noted, “We have worked a lot together. We did a lot of
field training together, so it is like we are brothers. Suffered through
it all together.”
But cohesion is not just developed in training. In the long, often
mundane, periods of time spent neither in training or actual combat,
the bonds between soldiers are often nurtured. One infantryman
spoke of cultivating relationships while pulling security:
I knew we were going to end up spending some time together, but I
never knew that we would be sleeping nose to nose, waking each other
up to stand guard over the hole. . . You are waking somebody up to help
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keep you awake and they will get up and talk to you for however long
it takes.

Interestingly, much of the cohesion in units is developed simply
because there is nothing else to do except talk. As one soldier
observed, “In a fighting hole with somebody for so many hours,
you get to know them real good because there is nothing else to talk
about. You become real good friends.” Another pointed out:
You are sitting in the dirt, scanning back and forth, [and] the only person
you got to talk to for me is him, which is on my left right here, about 18
inches away, sitting shoulder to shoulder. After about a month or so
in the dirt like that together, you start talking about family. You start
talking about everything . . . family, friends, what is going on, and your
life in general pretty much, what is not right at home. Everything.

While some soldiers referred to the relationships between soldiers
as “friendships,” most tried to convey the depth of the relationships
by using the analogy of the family. One soldier insightfully noted:
You are away from your family and everybody--I don’t care who you are,
even if you are in the States and you are not in the military--you are going
to look for something to attach yourself to. In the military, especially
when you come out to the field, you have no family. Everyone here
becomes your family. With my wife, for the first couple years of being
with her, I had to learn to live with her--her routine in the morning and
how my routine fits in with that, who uses the bathroom first and what
have you. It is the same thing with a bunch of Joe’s walking around. You
learn everybody’s personality--who is grumpy in the morning, who is
grumpy at night, and who is grumpy when they miss chow and let them
up in front of you. It is pretty much the same deal.

Another soldier echoed the family analogy by stating:
We eat, drink, [go to the bathroom]--everything--together. I think that
it should be like that . . . I really consider these guys my own family,
because we fight together, we have fun together. . . . We are to the point
where we even call the squad leader “Dad.”

Despite the academic debate concerning social cohesion and its
effects on performance, social cohesion remains a key component of
combat motivation in U.S. soldiers. Social cohesion is what motivates
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soldiers not only to perform their job, but also to accept responsibility
for the interests of other soldiers. At the same time, social cohesion
relieves each soldier of the constant concern for personal safety as
other members of the unit take on that responsibility.
Reporting the War.
To provide another perspective on cohesion in combat units, the
researchers solicited views from members of the embedded media,
who presented a unique point of view for two reasons. First, they
could describe small unit dynamics in combat from an observer
viewpoint. Because they were essentially outsiders, they did not
have to be committed to the unit’s mission or contribute to the unit
effort. Second, and more importantly, embedded media could relate
their own experiences with relationships in their embedded units.
It was expected that most of the embedded media would avoid
becoming too emotionally connected with soldiers to maintain
their objective, neutral journalist role. Staying aloof would avoid
predictions that the media embeds would “end up ‘in bed’ with their
military protectors.”29 As CBS anchor Dan Rather warned early in
the war, “There’s a pretty fine line between being embedded and
being entombed.”30
Embedded media were asked if their intentions were to establish
close bonds with the soldiers and then to describe the eventual
outcome as far as establishing emotional bonds. Surprisingly, the
overwhelming majority of the media interviewed did not attempt
to prevent any bonds from forming. One journalist commented, “I
knew they would form, I just didn’t know how strong they would
be.”31 For the media, cohesion provided the assurance that their
personal safety would not be imperiled. One media person noted,
“We were going to war. It was potentially dangerous. I needed to
get to know people to figure out who to trust if things got ugly.”
Another stated, “My intention all along was to form as close a bond
as possible, since my main objective was to come home safe, second
to telling the story.”
Nearly all of the embedded media stated that close emotional
bonds did form, although the bonds were not instantaneous. Similar
to the experience of soldiers, time spent together provided an
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opportunity for relationships to develop. As one embed stated, “It’s
impossible to spend that much time living and working with people
round-the-clock and not develop both a rapport and an affection.”
In the words of another journalist:
I felt at first the soldiers were very suspicious and leery of me. But as
the days went by and I faced the threats they faced and I went through
the hardships without complaint, and I helped wherever I could, and I
tried to do good deeds for them whenever possible, they came around
and actually ended up feeling quite a bit of affection for me. I certainly
did for them.

Another reporter related how he became close to his
“minder”:
At the battery level, I rode with this young lieutenant who was “in
charge” of media relations through the initial race across Iraq in the
opening few days of the war. We faced snipers and an enemy artillery
attack together and I think that helped form a bond. When we finally
made camp out in the desert and stayed there for a week or so, he and I
often chatted for hours on end (there not being much else to do most of
the time).

To many of the embeds, the relationships that formed were
surprising and profound. One reporter stated, “I don’t really have
many close male friends back here at home. So I didn’t expect
much in the way of close emotional relationships. I was pleasantly
surprised that I made some very close friendships with some of these
guys.” Another journalist reflected upon the experience and stated:
I am still in contact with the wives, who pass on messages from their
husbands. We also learned after we returned home that the two cots
[I and my photographer] used . . . were still in place and no one else
was allowed to sleep there, either out of respect for us or because they
think we might be back. Either way, I thought it was a nice tribute and
demonstrates in some small degree the respect they have for us and the
friendships we developed while telling the story of Charlie Co.’s war.

Interestingly, once a level of personal trust was established via
the emotional bonds with the soldiers, the embedded media felt as
if they could accomplish their job better. With their personal safety
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assured through the trust gained by closer personal relationships,
the media could fully concentrate on reporting the war. One
embedded journalist contrasted his experience in the Gulf War with
the Iraq War. In the Gulf War, he felt like an outsider and “a spy.”
In the Iraq War, he was able to deliver a better product--reporting
the war uninterrupted by a lack of trust. He commented, “War is
a barrier by itself, so you don’t need another barrier with a lack of
trust.” Another reporter noted, “I became so familiar with them that
I became part of the team. I was serving my nation as well, in a
different way, just like the soldiers.”
As far as becoming too close to the unit and losing objectivity, the
embedded media saw that the trust that comes with cohesion works
both ways. They could trust the soldiers, but the soldiers could also
trust the media to report fairly. After a serious incident occurred in
one unit, a reporter commented how the relationship he had formed
with the brigade commander allowed him to report on the incident:
What was really helpful was that by then, he and I had already got to
know each other. I liked him and trusted him. When he said he was
concerned about releasing certain information, he would give me a
reason, and the reason made sense. That is not generally the case even in
civilian life when dealing with officials in a crisis.

Another reporter, after experiencing the combat intensity of
purposefully driving into ambush after ambush on a “Thunder
Run” into Baghdad, described how the bonds he had formed helped
him overcome his reluctance to go again:
The company first sergeant, in whose APC I rode, asked me if I wanted
to stay behind that day because he knew it was going to be bad. But I felt
that if I opted out of that, it would be abandoning those guys. I felt I had
to be there to tell their story of the day they went into Baghdad to stay.
So, despite a great deal of concern, I went with them.

The perspectives of the embedded media are important
because they were a group that could choose their approach to
establishing relationships. While the bonds the embeds described
were often qualitatively different from the intense, almost familial
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relationships described by soldiers, the presence of soldiers with
whom relationships had been established gave the embedded media
a reassurance of their personal safety and an empowerment to do
their job.
Motivated by the Cause.
The conventional wisdom established by post-World War II
studies done on the American soldier is that soldiers fight for each
other. This generalization was and continues to be reinforced in
American society through media ranging from Mauldin’s Willie and
Joe cartoons to movies such as Blackhawk Down or Band of Brothers.
Indeed, the findings of this study add yet another example of how
cohesion serves as an important component of combat motivation
for U.S. soldiers.
Cohesion is not, of course, the only source of combat motivation.
The notion of fighting for one’s comrades has usually been contrasted
with the possibility that soldiers may be motivated in combat by
idealistic principles--fighting for the cause. Past researchers almost
always concluded that ideological notions are not prime sources
of combat motivation for American soldiers. For example, Civil
War researcher Bell Wiley studied both the Confederate and Union
armies. Concerning the Confederate soldiers, he wrote that “it is
doubtful whether many of them either understood or cared about
the Constitutional issues at stake.”32 Concerning the Union soldiers,
he wrote, “One searches most letters and diaries in vain for soldiers’
comment on why they were in the war or for what they were fighting.
. . . American soldiers of the 1860s appear to have been about as little
concerned with ideological issues as were those of the 1940s.”33
The soldiers in the 1940s were the subjects of Stouffer’s The
American Soldier studies. In that work, he noted that, “Officers and
enlisted men alike attached little importance to idealistic motives-patriotism and concern about war aims.”34 He added that except for
expressions of flagrant disloyalty, the strongest taboo in World War
II combat soldiers was “any talk of a flag-waving variety.”35
Surprisingly, in the present study, many soldiers did respond that
they were motivated by idealistic notions. Liberating the people and
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bringing freedom to Iraq were common themes in describing their
combat motivation. In the words of one soldier, “Liberating those
people. Liberating Iraq. Seeing them free. They were repressed for,
I don’t know how many years, 30 something years. Just knowing
that they are free now. Knowing that is awesome to me.” Another
soldier noted:
There were good times when we see the people. . . . How we liberated
them. That lifted up our morale. Seeing the little children. Smiling
faces. Seeing a woman and man who were just smiling and cheering
‘Good! Good! Good! Freedom Good!’ . . . That lifted us up and kept us
going. We knew we were doing a positive thing.

One embedded media person wrote, “By far the most powerful
motivation for many soldiers here is the belief that they will improve
life for the Iraqi people.”36 Another embed commented that soldiers
did fight out of a sense of camaraderie and a duty concept, but an
“icing of patriotism guides their decision to go down this path.”
Three points are important here. First, this combat motivation
centered on bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq. It was not
nationalism or even a national security issue, but a more fundamental
outcome addressing the people of Iraq. Although much of the official
rationale for the war was much more complex, e.g., “Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM is the multinational coalition effort to liberate the
Iraqi people, eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and end
the regime of Saddam Hussein,”37 soldiers focused only on the more
fundamental liberation aspects of the war aims.
Second is the timing of this response. Many soldiers described
how this motivation was revealed to them as combat progressed.
The images of Iraqi citizens, especially the children, helped the
realization of liberation as a motivation to emerge as the war
developed. As one soldier related:
After everything settled down we actually got to see some of the
people we liberated and we got to talk to them. I think that was the
most rewarding part of it. Getting to do presence patrol and seeing all
the little kids coming out and waving, everybody honking their horns,
everybody being happy because we came over here and we kicked some
ass.
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Another infantryman noted:
We were down for a while because we were in cities--all we did was get
shot at and we didn’t see no civilians until like now . . . I didn’t see it at
first, and then I saw the people coming back who are happy, it was like,
‘Thank You!’ That really was the turning point. Now I know what I am
doing.

It appears that today’s soldiers are motivated in actual combat
by fighting for their buddies, but once the war outcomes become
apparent, the motivation shifts to more ideological themes.
Additionally, these soldiers were interviewed just a few days after
major combat operations, but before units transitioned to the peace
enforcement role. Possibly, as soldiers experience a protracted
deployment supporting the Coalition Provisional Authority, this
motivation may shift again.
Third, while it is no longer taboo to talk about idealistic notions
--especially after September 11th, soldiers still find it difficult to
express this moral dimension of their combat motivation. It was not
uncommon for soldiers to tell of the difficulty of describing morally
charged values. Comments such as, “You just have to be there and
see it for yourself” or “You can’t really explain it” were frequent. As
one tongue-tied infantryman put it:
It may be a cornball answer, but believe me, I’m not into all that, but just
actually seeing some of them waving and shooting thumbs up. They are
like, ‘We love you America!’ . . . I am not like a very emotional person,
but the kids come up to you, they give you a hug. One lady came up to
one of our soldiers and tried to give him the baby so that the baby could
give him a kiss. It was like, ‘Whoa!!’ It was a heartfelt moment there for
me.

Despite the results of previous studies and the subsequent
conventional wisdom that American soldiers are not motivated by
ideological sentiments, many soldiers in this study reported being
motivated by notions of freedom, liberation, and democracy. Why
would today’s U.S. soldiers be more apt to speak of being motivated
by idealistic aims? Two possible reasons emerge.
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First, U.S. soldiers throughout history may have had ideological
motives, but did not realize it. In his study of American enlisted
men, Moskos argued that while cohesion is often the primary
combat motivation, supplementary factors (other than training
and equipment) must exist to explain why cohesion alone does
not determine battle performance. He posited that cohesion will
“maintain the soldier in his combat role only when he has an
underlying commitment to the worth of the larger social system for
which he is fighting.”38 He called this commitment a latent ideology
that supports the role of cohesion as a combat motivation. According
to Moskos, soldiers may not acknowledge or even know about this
latent ideology, but it nevertheless exists. Thus, while today’s
soldiers still feel awkward speaking of idealistic motivations, they
may be relatively less inhibited about articulating idealistic notions
compared to soldiers of the past.
Civil War historian James McPherson proposed another possibility
concerning why soldiers sometimes fight for ideology. McPherson
argued that ideology did serve as a combat motivation during the
Civil War. He proposed that three situational characteristics were
present during the Civil War that helped ideology emerge as a
combat motivation for both sides of that war. First, he noted that
the Confederate and Union armies were the most literate armies in
history to that time. Over 80 percent of the Confederate soldiers and
over 90 percent of the Union soldiers were literate. Second, most of the
soldiers were volunteers as opposed to draftees or conscripts. They
were not forced to take up arms. Finally, McPherson noted that Civil
War soldiers came from the world’s most politicized and democratic
society.39 Soldiers voted, read newspapers, and participated in
discussions concerning national issues. The interaction of these three
factors provided the conditions where soldiers were able, inclined,
and encouraged to debate ideological notions. Soldiers who are
educated, comfortable discussing ideological topics, and volunteers
are more apt to fight for the cause. As a result, McPherson argued
that Confederate soldiers fought “for liberty and independence
from what they regarded as a tyrannical government” while Union
soldiers fought “to preserve the nation created by the founders from
dismemberment and destruction.”40
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Interestingly, the same three conditions exist today. Soldiers are
well-educated. The average education of a new soldier in 2002 was
12.1 years of education. That implies that the average new soldier
is more than a high school graduate; he or she has some college
experience. Soldiers are also older and more mature than we think.
In 2002, the average new soldier was 21.1 years old.
Soldiers are also amazingly in touch with the pressing issues
of the day. Via the Internet, Fox News, and CNN, they know the
world situation, who the key players are, and the essence of the
policy debates. When The New York Times quoted an infantryman
of the 3rd Infantry Division as saying, “You call Donald Rumsfeld
and tell him our sorry asses are ready to go home,”41 it was not only
surprising to hear such a direct message being conveyed up the
chain of command, but it was also eye-opening that a Private First
Class (PFC) would even know who the Secretary of Defense was.
One embedded journalist commented on the underestimated
sophistication of today’s soldiers and said, “Soldiers I encountered
were trained, ethical, thoughtful, and intelligent. It was not unusual
to talk to a Private or PFC and be absolutely astounded at how
well he could talk about why they were there [fighting in Iraq].”
Additionally, soldiers are attuned to ideology, values, and abstract
principles. Since the day they took their enlistment oaths, they have
been bombarded with idealistic notions. New soldiers are socialized
to be comfortable talking about value-laden ideas ranging from the
seven Army values to the Soldier’s Creed.42
Finally, today’s soldiers are volunteers. They were not coerced
into service, and they did not approach the military as the employer
of last resort. They come from a generation that trusts the military
institution. In 1975, a Harris Poll reported that only 20 percent of
people ages 18 to 29 said they had a great deal of confidence in
those who ran the military.43 Compare that with a recent poll by
the Harvard Institute of Politics that found that 70 percent of college
undergraduates trust the military to do the right thing either all or
most of the time.44 Soldiers understand that they are professionals
in a values-based institution. They trust each other, their leaders, the
Army, and they understand the moral aspects of war.
The U.S. Army has matured from a conscript army, through a
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fledgling all-volunteer army, to what is now a truly professional
army. Professional soldiers still fight for each other, but professional
soldiers also accept the responsibility that the Army has entrusted
to them. Evidence of this transition is found even in the families
of today’s soldiers. When reporters interviewed wives about their
husbands’ delayed redeployment from Iraq, one sergeant’s wife
commented, “As military spouses, we know our husbands have
responsibilities. They are professionals doing their jobs.” Another
spouse added, “I wonder how [complaining] must sound to someone
who’s lost someone.” 45 Still another spouse noted, “I could have
married anyone else who would have been at work 9 to 5. The job
(my husband) does is an amazingly honorable one.”46
Conclusion.
Shortly after the latest Iraq War, Colonel Abdul-Zahra of the
former Iraqi Army commented that, “The U.S. Army is certainly the
best in the world. But it’s not because of the fighting men, but because
of their equipment.”47 Colonel Abdul-Zahra missed the point. The
Iraq War showed that while the U.S. Army certainly has the best
equipment and training, a human dimension is often overlooked.
As military historian Victor Davis Hanson observed shortly after the
end of major combat operations in Iraq:
The lethality of the military is not just organizational or a dividend of
high-technology. Moral and group cohesion explain more still. The
general critique of the 1990s was that we had raised a generation with
peroxide hair and tongue rings, general illiterates who lounged at malls,
occasionally muttering ‘like’ and ‘you know’ in Sean Penn or Valley Girl
cadences. But somehow the military has married the familiarity and
dynamism of crass popular culture to 19th-century notions of heroism,
self-sacrifice, patriotism, and audacity.48

The soldiers interviewed for this study presented an impression
that was often crude, vulgar, and cynical, yet that impression was
leavened with a surprisingly natural acceptance of the institution’s
values. The U.S. Army is the best in the world because, in addition to
possessing the best equipment, its soldiers also have an unmatched
level of trust. They trust each other because of the close interpersonal
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bonds between soldiers. They trust their leaders because their leaders
have competently trained their units. And they trust the Army
because, since the end of the draft, the Army has had to attract its
members rather than conscripting them. Unable any longer to obtain
labor by force, the all-volunteer Army was “compelled to transform
itself into an institution that people would respect and trust. Bonds
forged by trust replaced bonds forged by fear of punishment.”49
Because our soldiers trust the Army as an institution, they now look
to the Army to provide the moral direction for war. As this study
has shown, soldiers still fight for each other. In a professional army,
however, soldiers are also sophisticated enough to grasp the moral
reasons for fighting.
Implications.
Two implications result from this study. First, cohesion, or the
strong emotional bonds between soldiers, continues to be a critical
factor in combat motivation. One of the main purposes of the Unit
Manning System is to increase unit cohesion. While critics may
attack the implications of the Unit Manning System because of the
effects on leader development, total force turbulence, or increased
personnel management complexities, denouncing cohesion as either
irrelevant or detrimental is nonsensical. Likewise, attempting to
dissect cohesion into social or task cohesion and then comparing
correlations with performance is best left to the antiseptic
experiments of academia. For those interested in overturning the
DoD homosexual conduct policy, it may be prudent to choose a
strategy other than questioning the linkage between cohesion and
combat performance.
The Iraq War confirms what every combat soldier already
knows--cohesion places a shared responsibility for the success of
the unit on each individual while giving each soldier the confidence
that someone else is watching over them. Spending large amounts
of time together, usually in austere conditions, develops this trusting
relationship. The Iraqi and American armies provide an interesting
contrast in cohesion. In the former, the absence of cohesion made
the surrender decision easy. In the latter, the presence of cohesion
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was a primary source of combat motivation.
The second implication concerns the transformation of the force
to a professional army. The move from a struggling all-volunteer
army to a truly professional force has not been easy. Early problems
in the “hollow” Army included declining enlistment propensity,
low quality recruits, high attrition, and plummeting morale.50 Seven
years into the experiment, Richard Nixon, who introduced the allvolunteer Army, wrote, “The volunteer army has failed to provide
enough personnel of the caliber we need for our highly sophisticated
armaments.”51 The Army rebounded in the 1980s with “Be All You
Can Be” and a recruiting overhaul, but the 1990s dismantled much
of what had been accomplished through a demoralizing downsizing.
The survivors picked up the pieces, however, and overcame another
recruiting crisis in the late 1990s. Today, the “Army of One” is the
culmination of 30 years of movement toward a professional Army.
It is a high-tech, highly trained, and highly professional force.
The bonds of trust among soldiers, their leaders, and the Army as
an institution, however, are not invulnerable. Horror film director
John Carpenter was once asked what he thought scared people the
most. His answer: “Uncertainty.”52 Uncertainty can unravel the
trust that provides the underpinnings for the professional Army
through two means.
First, uncertainty can be introduced by subjecting the Army to a
major downsizing. The research is clear that downsizing severely
damages the psychological contract between an organization and its
downsizing survivors.53 Those left behind grapple with uncertainty
in the form of wondering about the magnitude and duration of
the downsizing, the management of the downsizing, determining
who will pick up the remaining workload after the reductions, and
wondering if their turn is next. In the rush for lessons learned after
the Iraq War, there has been enough talk of trading force for speed
that the specter of an Army downsizing in the future is real.
Second, uncertainty can be imposed on the Army through openended deployments. Soldiers will salute and deploy to distant parts
of the world when ordered, but when their redeployment date
is uncertain, trust with the institution is strained. Much like the
society they represent, today’s soldiers view wars in terms of weeks,
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not months, e.g., a CBS poll early in the war showed 62 percent of
Americans believing that the war would be “quick and successful.”54
While today’s wars may be prosecuted quickly, the ensuing
peace operations continue indefinitely. As a result, the Army is
increasingly stretched over 120 countries, and the ability to redeploy
soldiers home after an operation has diminished significantly. After
observing the current situation, Michael O’Hanlon noted, “It would
be the supreme irony, and a national tragedy, if after winning two
wars in 2 years, the U.S. Army were broken and defeated while
trying to keep the peace.”55
This study set out to examine why soldiers fight. The findings
showed that U.S. soldiers continue to fight because of the bonds
of trust between soldiers. They also fight, however, because of the
bonds of trust established with the Army as an institution. Our
soldiers are professionals and are the culmination of 30 years of an
all-volunteer force. While that may be cause for commemoration, it
is also cause for consideration as policymakers chart the course for
the future.
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